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Van de Vate: The New Philosophy

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY AND ITS STYLE
by Dwight Van de Vate, Jr.

The absolute idealist movement in British philosophy began
with the publication of Hutchinson Stirling’s The Secret of Hegel
in 1865. Bernard Bosanquet’s Gifford Lectures of 1911-1912 were
its last major production. By the death of F. H. Bardley in 1924 the
effective force of the movement had ended. Bradley was its most
profound and original member and his Appearance and Reality
its most influential book. A sample passage:
And hence, for the present at least, we must
believe that reality satisfies our whole being.
Our main wants—for truth and life, and for
beauty and goodness—must all find satisfaction.
And we have seen that this consummation must
somehow be experience, and be individual. Every
element of the universe, sensation, feeling,
thought, and will, must be included within one
comprehensive sentience.1

The style is grave, heightened, formal, suiting the subject—“the
Absolute.” It is impossible to think of Bradley telling a joke. He
does not preach or edify, he states the truth and the reasons for it.
His “we” refers to all who undertake the serious business of
reasoning about the ultimate nature of the universe and human
life.
After the Great War, the fashion changed. Idealism—in its
several senses—died at Ypres and the Somme. The generation that
1F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1955), p. 140.
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marched off to the trenches with the unaffected high spirits and
copy-book maxims of Lord Baden-Powell’s England returned—the
few who did return—without illusions. To them the academic
grandiosity of absolute idealism was synthetic and dishonest. If
indeed “the utility of metaphysics is to be found in the comfort it
can give us,"2 then metaphysics, they thought, must be irrelevant
and cheap. It was time for a new philosophical fashion and for
a new style of philosophical writing.
The leaders of the new fashion were Bertrand Russell, G. E.
Moore, and the Austrian, Ludwig Wittgenstein. No one has stated
its basic theme better than Russell:
The kernel of the scientific outlook is a thing
so simple, so obvious, so seemingly trivial, that
the mention of it may almost excite derision. The
kernel of the scientific outlook is the refusal to
regard our own desires, tastes, and interests as
affording a key to the understanding of the
world.3
The hope of satisfaction to our more human de
sires—the hope of demonstrating that the world
has this or that desirable ethical characteristic—
is not one which, so far as I can see, a scientific
philosophy can do anything whatever to satisfy.4
A technological war had occurred simultaneously with revolution
ary advances in physical theory. The new philosophy therefore
was founded on the conviction that it is the function of the scien
tist alone to discover the facts. The philosopher’s concern is
not for the facts themselves, but for the language in which they
are stated. Scientists state the truth, philosophers analyze the mean
ings of words. Philosophy became “analytic.”
The new analytic philosophy was dominated between the wars
by the symbolic logic movement which stemmed from Whitehead
2J. E. McTaggart, Philosophical Studies, p. 184, quoted in G. J. Warnock,
English Philosophy since
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958),
p. 5.
3Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pen
guin Books, 1953), p. 46. The essay, “The Place of Science in a Liberal Edu
cation,” from which this passage is taken was first published in 1913.
4Ibid., p. 34. The essay Mysticism and Logic,” from which this passage
is taken was first published in 1914.
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and Russell’s Principia Mathematica of 1910-1913. This phase is
called "Logical Positivism.” The logical positivists aimed to elimi
nate metaphysics by devising symbolic calculi or artificial lan
guages in which only scientifically meaningful propositions could be
expressed. Driven from their hiding places in the imprecisions of
ordinary language, metaphysical problems would thus be shown
to be unreal “pseudo-problems.” The program’s most influential
statement was Wittgenstein’s Tractates Logico-Philosophicus of
1922.

Early in the 1930’s Wittgenstein rejected the logical positivists’
attempts (including his own) to impose a single standard of pre
cision on language. He now regarded ordinary languages such as
English or German not as pre-scientific approximations to logical
calculi, but as instruments of a suppleness and subtlety adequate
to the multifarious tasks for which humans use them. One elimi
nates metaphysics, he now thought, not by escaping from ordinary
language, but by using it correctly. The pseudo-problems of the
metaphysician result from his misuses of ordinary idiom, from his
failure to see the jobs words do. Hence the philosopher’s function
is therapeutic: he shows those troubled by metaphysical perplex
ities how their (pseudo-) problems come from using words in
illegitimate ways. It not necessary to invent artificial languages
in which metaphysical propositions cannot be expressed. They can
not be expressed grammatically even in ordinary language.
The impact of Wittgenstein’s new program of “ordinary lan
guage analysis” on the British philosophical public was gradual, but
pervasive. He lectured from 1930 to 1947 at Cambridge; while he
published almost nothing, his lectures were circulated in manu
script. By the posthumous publication in 1953 of the definitive
statement of his later philosophy, the Philosophical Investigations,
his influence had come to dominate philosophy in Great Britain.
There are signs that it may soon dominate philosophy in the
United States as well.

The style of the new philosophy has been influenced more by
G. E. Moore than by Wittgenstein, who wrote in German. Moore
a curiously “adverbial” figure: what he had to say was of less
importance than the painstaking effort at clarity and logical rigor
with which he said it. He was concerned to defend “common
sense”—the plain man’s belief that there an external world, that
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he has a body, that there are other people, etc.—against what he
conceived to be the slipshod and precipitate arguments of the
absolute idealists. But common sense is where philosophy begins,
not where it ends. Moore’s position was negative: intentionally, he
had nothing new to say. What was new was the ruthless sincerity
and indefatigability of his effort to say exactly what he meant.

In this regard, one may single out three features of Moore’s
style: his addiction to italicization, his fondness for expostulatory
phrases, and his use of the first-person-singular form of organiza
tion. In the Principia Ethica (1903), a book of two hundred and
thirty-one pages, there are eighteen pages where no italicized
word occurs. This paragraph from the "Refutation of Idealism” il
lustrates Moore’s use of italics:
Now I think I am not mistaken in asserting that
the reason why Idealists suppose that everything
which is must be an inseparable aspect of some
experience,
that they suppose some things, at
least, to be inseparable aspects of their experience.
And there is certainly nothing which they are so
firmly convinced to be an inseparable aspect of
their experience as what they call the content of
their ideas and sensations. If, therefore, this turns
out in every case, whether it be also the content
or not, to be at least not an inseparable aspect of
the experience of it, it will be readily admitted
that nothing else which we experience ever is
such an inseparable aspect. But if we never
experience anything but what is not an insepara
ble aspect of that experience, how can we infer
that anything whatever, let alone everything, is
an inseparable aspect of any experience? How
utterly unfounded is the assumption that “esse
is percipi” appears in the clearest light.5

The italics emphasize like blows of a hammer.
5G. E. Moore, The Refutation of Idealism,” in W. Barrett and H. D.
Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House,
1962), p. 559.
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The tone of the paragraph is expostulatory: "there is certainly
nothing of which they are so firmly convinced . . . ,” "nothing else
which we experience ever . . . ,” "how can we infer that anything
whatever, let alone everything . . . "how utterly unfounded . . . "
In each case, the emphasis is stronger than a simple statement of
fact would require. Here are the first and last sentences of the
same essay:
Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general con
clusion about the universe at all, asserts that it
spiritual.6
All other suppositions—the Agnostic’s, that some
thing, at all events, does exist, as much as the
Idealist’s, that spirit does—are, if we have no
reason for believing in matter, as baseless as the
grossest superstitions.7
The effect is intense indignation. One imagines Moore shaking his
head and striking the air with his forefinger.

The object of this impassioned concern in the "Refutation of
Idealism” was, on Moore’s own insistence, nothing much:
The subject of this paper
therefore, quite
uninteresting. Even if I prove my point, I shall
have proved nothing about the Universe in gen
eral. ... I shall only try to arrive at the truth
about a matter, which
in itself quite trivial
and insignificant, and from which, so far as I
can see and certainly so far as I shall say, no
conclusions can be drawn about any of the sub
jects about which we most want to know ....
[From my argument] it will indeed follow that
all the most striking results of philosophy . . .
have, for all that has hitherto been urged in their
favour, no more foundation than the supposition
that a chimera lives in the moon. It will follow
that, unless new reasons never hitherto urged
can be found, all the most important philosophic
doctrines have as little claim to assent as the
most superstitious beliefs of the lowest savages.8
6Ibid., p. 543.
7Ibid., p. 561.
8Ibid., pp. 545-546.
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Here the reaction to Bradley and the Idealists
total. If they
rescued the Good, the True, and the Beautiful—the Things that
Matter—with a grubby unconcern for their own objectivity, Moore,
on the contrary, will practise a pure logical punctiliousness, an
impeccable argumentative rigor.

However, the plain man’s beliefs are not the conclusion of a
constructive argument, but the premiss of a destructive one. One
does not arrive at Common Sense, one starts from it. Hence Moore’s
logical conscientiousness had only a negative function. Common
Sense will stolidly persist in the plain man s consciousness whether
defended or not. Accordingly—and the conclusion is not meant
pejoratively — Moore purchased rigor at the price of relevancy, just
as he regarded the Idealists as doing the reverse. The practice of
philosophy had an effect on Moore’s intellectual conscience, but
not on his, or anyone’s, substantive beliefs. So a recent and sym
pathetic commentator can write that "among the immediately
operative factors contributing to the decay of Absolute Idealism,
special notice should be paid to the character of Moore.”9
It was character—in the intellectual sense—that Moore display
ed in his writings. He had not Russell’s limpid clarity or hilariously
malicious wit. Character is personal. Arguing was an activity Moore
personally undertook. His essays do not organize themselves, he
organizes them, he "proposes to dispute,” he "wishes to show,” he
will "prove his point” This first-person organization
 is sometimes
belligerent:
I begin, then, with my list of truisms, every one
of which (in my own opinion) I know, with cer
tainty, to be true.10

Nothing dictated Moore’s defence of Common Sense but his per
sonal intellectual affront at the Idealists’ reasons for rejecting it
Common Sense was placidly indifferent to both. Moore argued on
his own initiative. Hence the first-person manner of organiza
tion, and hence also the reiterated avowals: "I think,” ‘I mean,”
“I believe,” "in my opinion.” Assaulting an orthodoxy in the name of
9Wamock, op.
p. 12.
10G. E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense,” in Barrett and Aiken,
op.
p. 562.
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a position it scorned as banal, that he himself thought banal, Moore
had constantly to affirm his sincerity. It was his keenest weapon.
Yesterday’s iconoclasm becomes today’s orthodoxy. This meta
morphosis has happend to Wittgenstein and Moore. The British
philosophical community is far more intimate and monochromatic
than the American: it nourishes one fashion at a time. If the
doctrines of the new orthodoxy, ordinary language analysis, are
Wittgenstein’s, the style descends from Moore—the frequent italicization, the first-person-singular organization. Moores indignant
earnestness, however, has been replaced by a lightness of tone that
becomes on occasion even playful:

People used to say this kind of thing prior to
Russell, and it had its merits. But it also had
its defects, because it led people to ask peculiar
questions, like whether Minerva and the class of
voters could all get in through the door at the
same time.11
Having thus put myself way out on a limb, I
may expect the objection: “This
sheer sophis
try: what the sponsor said is true if every doctor
agrees that Stopsneeze helps, otherwise it is
false. 12

Suppose we never break through the “is-ought”
barrier, what then? Let us speculate. Then we
can never justify ethics and morality. Well, per
haps this would only be true for natura
lists . . . 13

These examples are chosen as extreme. Most philosophical prose,
now as in Bradley's day, is formal. Today, however, even the most
formal writing is not heightened, but logical, unemotional. Illus
trations are chosen from everyday life:
Thus suppose that I am riding across the west
ern plains and notice intermittent clouds of
11J. Jarvis, “
on Strawson’s Logic,” Mind, LXX,
277 (January,
1961), 65.
12Z. Vendler, “Each and Every, Any and All,” Mind, LXXI, no. 282 (April,
1962), 155.
18M. Zimmerman, The Is-Ought’: An Unnecessary Dualism,” Mind,
LXXI, no. 281 (January, 1962), 53.

Published by eGrove, 1963


7
no.

Studies in English, Vol. 4 [1963], Art. 11

The New Philosophy

90

smoke rising from a hill to the right. ... I am
frightened of the Indians of whose presence, and
interest, the smoke is a sign.14

They are phrases like "the time at which the
letter was posted,” or "the amount of arsenic he
put in her tea,” which are convertible into in
direct questions... .15
If I buy a red hat, looking at it carefully in day
light, it will be red when I get home.16
There are occasional illustrations from physics, and from behavior
al psychology, to which a certain affinity is felt. (Mind, the lead
ing British journal, encourages it.) The philosophy of mathematics,
a legacy of Logical Positivism, is rapidly being abandoned, as
the symbolic logicians themselves move into mathematics. The use
of illustrations from history or literature is sparing to the point
of exclusion. Contemporary political conflicts are ignored, in sharp
contrast with Continental philosophy, which dominated by them.
The total absence of appeals, tacit or explicit, to any human inerest but the urge for refined logical precision gives to this writing
an air of drab severity, lightened here and there by strained
whimsy.

Behind the sense of exactness imparted by italicization and
similar devices (quotation marks, numbered propositions), behind
the resolutely "ordinary” illustrations, stands the unexpressed sup
position that the price of precision is disengagement. The world
enters into ordinary language analysis only through ordinary lan
guage. The philosopher deals with the facts at second remove:
with the language of ethics, not ethics, the language of religion,
not religion, etc. He
detached, unemotional, save about lan
guage itself; there he can be affectionate:

It is crucial to an understanding of morality that

14J. Gosling, "Mental Causes and Fear,” Mind, LXXI,
283 (July,
1962), 291-292.
15,D. Gallopp, "On Being Determined,” Mind,
no. 282 (April, 1962),
193.
16E. H. Wolgast, "Qualities and Illusions,’’ Mind, LXXI, no. 284 (October,
1962), 470.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/ms_studies_eng/vol4/iss1/11


8

Van de Vate: The New Philosophy

91

Dwight Van de Vate, Jr.

this truth about the uses of our language be
understood.17
Ordinary language, well used, is extremely flex
ible and precise; but the difference between its
flexibility and precision and that of scientific
language comes out in the fact that we never
use the word nuance’ in the latter.18
Yet, curiously, his treatment of ordinary language is not scientific;
he does not count the frequency of occurrence of words or com
pare the grammars of different languages, and linguistic scientists
have ignored him.

The effect of this abstractness on style is to be seen in the
first-person-singular form of organization. Wittgenstein found it
fruitful to think of languages as games. This metaphor, with its
suggestion of detachment, has become a standard idiom. The
philosopher approaches his subject-matter unsolicited. No public
necessity of science or politics or religion compels him to philos
ophize. The commitments of a spokesman would impair his ob
jectivity. His writings are organized
a display not of the in
telligibility of his topic, but of his own skill.
The philosophy of an era lives and maintains itself among shift
ing allegiances and animosities with science, religion, politics, and
its own philosophical predecessors. This historical involvement
creates doctrine, and doctrine will find a congenial style. The Log
ical Positivism to which ordinary language analysis is a reaction
was itself a reaction to the First World War. It aimed to be
scientific: it scorned politics as propaganda, religion as dishonesty,
morality as emotion. Now, in the decline of empire, the scientific
ideal has been abandoned; philosophy is a twice-attenuated ghost.
Style reflects this attenuation. Conceivably, the very gracelessness
of today’ philosophical writing may accelerate a doctrinal reac
tion. If accuracy need not be flat and laborious, if eloquence is
authentic precision, then the ordinary language analysts may come
in time to the recognition that their style implicitly traduces their
own professed love, language, and reflects the fact that they have
very little to say.
17K. Nielsen, “Some Remarks on the Independence of Morality from Re
ligion ” Mind, LXX, no. 278 (April, 1961), 186.
18P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books,
1954), p. 97.
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